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A PositivePoliticalModel of Supreme
Court EconomicDecisions
Tony Caporale* and Harold Wintert
We develop a positivepoliticalmodel of the U.S. SupremeCourt.Lookingat the Court's
of conservative
economiccases fortheperiod1953-1993,we finda significant
largerfraction
and moreconservative
decisionsunderRepublicanpresidents
leadershipof the House and
Conservative
decisionsare also foundto be positively
Committees.
correlated
SenateJudiciary
oftheCourtappointed
andtherateofpriceinflation.
withthefraction
byRepublicanpresidents
cast seriousdoubton thecommonviewof theSupremeCourtas a
We arguethatourfindings
completely
independent,
apoliticalinstitution.

1. Introduction
A starkcontrastexists between the widespread application of positive political economy
models in the study of the executive and legislative branches of governmentand the relative
dearthof such work on thejudiciary. In particular,the U.S. Supreme Court is widely regarded
as a totallyindependentbody whose rulings are not influencedby political or other outside
pressures.Indeed, the dominantpolitical science model of Supreme Court decision making,the
attitudinalmodel, argues thatthe rules and structuresof the U.S. political systemallow justices
to vote sincerely withoutconstraintsfrom Congress and/orthe president(Segal and Spaeth

1993).

In contrastto this dominantview, several authorshave begun to analyze Supreme Court
decisions guided by the positive models of bureaucraticbehaviorthatexist in boththe economics and the political science literature.Toma (1991) findsthatCongress signals its opinion of
the Court's directionthroughbudgetaryallocations, and thatbudget changes have a significant
effecton Court decisions. Her more recentwork (Toma 1996) focuses on the role of the chief
justice as an agent of Congress who reacts to budgetarysignals to bringCourt decisions in line
with congressionalpreferences.Spiller and Gely (1992) findstrongevidence of congressional
influenceover Court decisions in industriallabor relationscases. Caporale and Winter(1998)
findsupportforthe existenceof bothexecutive and congressionalinfluenceover SupremeCourt
decisions in criminalprocedurecases.
This paper investigatespossible outside influenceson SupremeCourtdecisions in economic cases. We findthat Republican presidentsand more conservativeleadership of the Senate
correlatedwith more conservativeSupreme
and House JudiciaryCommitteesare significantly
Court economic decisions. In addition,we findthatconservativedecisions are positivelycor*
author.
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related withthe fractionof the Court appointedby Republican presidents.This provides strong
supportfor a presidential"power of appointment"channel of judicial influence.Also, we find
thatthe lagged inflationrate significantly
influencesthe directionof the Court's economic decisions. Finally, we demonstratethe robustnessof our resultsusing an alternativemeasure of
congressionalideology.

2. Theoriesof SupremeCourt Behavior
The Traditional Legal Model
Courts are the mere instruments
of the law, and can will nothing.When theyare said to exercise discretion,
it is a mere legal discretion,a discretionto be exercised in discerningthe course prescribedby law; and,
when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the
purpose of giving effectto the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effectto the will of the
Legislature; or, in otherwords, to the will of the Law.
-Chief JusticeJohnMarshall, 1824'

As recentlegal analystshave noted,the vast bulk of legal scholarshipand contentof law
school traininglargely rests on JusticeMarshall's contention.2Explicitlyor implicitly,an assumptionis made thatcourt decisions are based centrallyon reasoned arguments.This view,
in which judges apply neutralprinciplesand logical reasoningto the Constitution,priorprecedents,or statutesin resolvingcases is labeled the "traditionallegal model."
Perhaps the clearest proponentand strongestadvocate of the traditionalmodel was ChristopherColumbus Langdell, the Harvard Law School's firstdean.3 For the Langdellian judge,
judicial decisions are based on logical reasoningor reasoningby example. Primaryimportance
is placed on textualinterpretation
and legal precedent.From this framework,decisions can be
viewed as inevitableconclusions based on the analysis of earliercases. Clearly,this model left
no room for any expressionof judicial individualityor personal ideology.

The AttitudinalModel
In contrastto the formalismof the traditionalmodel, political scientistshave developed
an alternativetheoryof Supreme Court (and otherjudicial) decision making: the attitudinal
model. The attitudinalmodel holds thatjudges decide disputes on the basis of their sincere
ideological attitudesand values. The attitudinalmodel assumes thatjudges can maximizeutility
by renderingthe decision thatmost pleases them ideologically, withoutregard to otherinstitutionsor considerations.Judgesare viewed as makingresult-oriented
decisions based on ideology as opposed to the law or legal precedent.
The foundationfortheattitudinaltheorywas laid by theimportantworkby Pritchett
(1948)
on the Roosevelt Supreme Court. Using simple statisticsto analyze micro-level voting, he
identifieddistinctliberal and conservativevoting blocs. Althoughhe did not presenta model
of the Court's decision making,his work led to the developmentof behavioral models of the
Supreme Court.
Rhode and Spaeth (1976) provide the classic formulationof the attitudinalmodel. They
I Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824).

2

For example, see Cross (1997) and George (1998).
See Grey (1983) for a discussion of the genesis of Langdell's theoryof law.
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argue that the primarygoals of justices are policy goals, and voting is an attemptto move
decision outcomes as closely as possible to those policy preferences.Justicesare freeto vote
protections(e.g., life tenureand
accordingto theirsincerepreferencessince various institutional
influences.
them
from
outside
insulate
is
no
there
the fact that
higherappeal)

Positive Political Theory
Positive political theory(PPT) applied to the Supreme Court largely agrees withthe attitudinaliststhatjustices are makingpolitical,policy-orienteddecisions. However,proponentsof
PPT argue that the Court is not insulated from political pressure and that the institutional
protectionof the Court is not complete.For example, Congress can readilyoverturnthe Court's
statutorydecisions. Therefore,if the Courtis concernedabout ultimatepolicy outcomes,it must
take the political climate into account when renderingdecisions. Recent empirical work by
Toma (1991, 1996), Spiller and Gely (1992), and Caporale and Winter(1998) all providesupport
for the PPT approach applied to the Supreme Court.

3. SupremeCourt Data
Our data on Supreme Court economics cases are taken fromHarold Spaeth's exhaustive
U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1993 term.4Spaeth partitionsthe data into 13
differentbroad issue areas, includingone on economic activity.5Our sample includes all economic activitycases thatwere fullyargued beforethe Court between 1953 and 1993 forwhich
Spaeth assigns a directionto the decision. In the contextof economic activitycases, Spaeth's
directionvariable is a binary variable assigned a value of 1 if the decision is "conservative"
and a value of 0 if the decision is "liberal." In the descriptionof his database, Spaeth describes
"liberal" in the contextof economic activitycases to referto such situationsas anti-business,
pro-liability,pro-injuredperson, pro-indigent,pro-small busipro-competition,
anti-employer,

ness vis-a-vis large business, pro-debtor,pro-bankrupt,
protection,pro-ecopro-environmental
in governmentalcorruption.
nomic underdog,pro-consumer,and pro-accountability
In previous studiesexamininglabor union cases and criminalprocedurecases, thedirection
variable appears to be less ambiguous than in the currentstudy.For example, in labor union
cases, "liberal" refersto pro-union.In criminalprocedurecases, "liberal" refersto pro-defendant. Because the meaningof "liberal" in economic activitycases may at times appear ambiguous, it is worthbrieflyexamininga few individualcases to betterunderstandSpaeth's definition
of his directionvariable.

Antitrust
In a 1988 "liberal" decision, a group of doctors who owned a clinic peer reviewed and
barredanotherdoctor (who owned a competingclinic) fromusing the only local hospital.The
doctors' claim thatphysicianpeer review is exemptfromfederalantitrustlaws was denied.6In
4

Consortiumfor Political and Social Research (ICPSR) database no. 9422.
Inter-University

5 The other broad issue areas are criminal procedure, civil rights,First Amendment,due process, privacy, attorneys,
6

unions,judicial power, federalism,interstaterelations,federaltaxation,and miscellaneous.
Patrick v. Burget, 108 S.Ct. 1658 (1988).
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another 1988 case, one retailerof calculators complained to the manufacturerabout another
terminatedits relationshipwith the second dealerlocal retailer'sprices, and the manufacturer
were involved in
ship. The terminateddealer's claim thatthe firstdealer and the manufacturer
a per se illegal verticalagreementwas denied by the Court. The "conservative" decision was
that for a vertical agreementto be per se illegal, there must be some agreementon prices,
which did not occur in this case.7

Legal Remedies
In a 1998 case, an injuredworkerat a federallyowned but privatelyoperatednuclearplant
appealed to a state regulatorfor additionalbenefitsto be paid out by the plant. The "liberal"
decision was a denial by the Courtof theplant'srequestforfederalshieldingof stateregulation.8
In a "conservative" 1988 decision, a formerfederalemployee who was suspended because of
misconductwas denied the rightto receive back pay.9

State Tax
In a 1988 case, a taxpayerchallenged the state of Louisiana's authorityto tax a catalog
thatwas produced outside the state but distributedwithinthe state. The Court's "liberal" decision was to uphold Louisiana's rightto tax the catalog.'0 In a 1989 case, a taxpayerchallenged
the stateof West Virginia's authorityto assess a recentlysold propertyhigherthancomparable
(but not recentlysold) property.The Court's "conservative" decision was thatWest Virginia's
taxingpolicy violated the 14th Amendment'sequal protectionclause."
discriminatory
Althoughthese cases representonly a portionof the type of cases included in Spaeth's
categoryof economic activitycases, theyprovide an indicationof the meaningof the direction
variable.12 While a criterionsuch as "pro-competition"may be ambiguous to an economist,
to Spaeth
such as in the case of a mergerpotentiallybeing pro-competitiveor anti-competitive,
a mergerthatis upheld by the Court would always be an example of a "conservative" decision.
This is not a criticismof Spaeth's definitionsince he is not categorizinghis decisions as ecoIndeed, the importantpoint is thathis definitionsof "liberal"
nomicallyefficientor inefficient.
and "conservative" fitwell withwhatcongressmenand senators(and theirconstituents)believe
the termsto mean.
Over the 41-year sample period,thereare 9743 decisions in the economics cases category.
As thereare enough decisions in any single year (a minimumof 117 in 1954 and a maximum
of 403 in 1986), we can compute a variable that measures the percentage of conservative
decisions in each year. In contrastto Spiller and Gely, for example, our dependentvariable is
a continuous,as opposed to a binary,measure of Supreme Court votingbehavior.While their
measure allows them to use a data set with 249 observations,ours allows for a sample with

7 Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).
8
Goodyear Atomic v. Miller, 108 S.Ct. 1704 (1988).
9 U.S. v. Fausto, 108 S.Ct. 668 (1988).
I D. H. Holmes v. McNamara, 108 S.Ct. 1619 (1988).
" Allegheny PittsburghCoal v. County Commission of Webster County, 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989).
12 Some of the other issues included in the economic activitycategory are state regulationof business, environmental
protectionof natural resources, zoning, federal consumer protection,patents and copyrights,federal transportation
regulation,bankruptcy,liability(nongovernmental),federalregulationof securities,and federalpublic utilitiesregulation.
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Figure 1. Percentageof Conservative Supreme Court Economic Decisions

only 41 observations.However,because all their(and our) explanatoryvariables have no crosssectional variation,any variationin the dependentvariable in eitherformcan be due only to
yearlyvariationsin the explanatoryvariables.13One advantage of our measure is thatit allows
us to use a large numberof Supreme Court cases. For Spiller and Gely's interestin labor union
cases, our measure would not be as informativebecause theirdata set consists of, on average,
only six decisions per year. Coincidentally,the Spaeth data set we employ does not include
labor union cases in the economics cases category,so we are presentingevidence of political
influenceover the Supreme Court with a previouslyunused data set. Figure 1 is a plot of our
dependentvariable over the sample period. Dickey-Fuller and augmentedDickey-Fullertests
stronglyrejectthe presence of a unitrootin our dependentvariable. The mean of our dependent
variable is .455 (standarddeviation = .17) and ranges between .695 and .132.

4. Hypothesesand EmpiricalResults
Priorto searchingforoutside influenceson Supreme Court voting,we must deal withthe
problemof selection bias in our data. This bias arises because the Court can uphold a decision
simplyby refusingto hear a case. Therefore,we expect to findan inverserelationshipbetween
the average directionof the lower court ruling and thatof the Supreme Court. To correctfor
this bias, we include a variable thatmeasures the average directionof the lower-courtdecisions
forthe cases in our sample.14
The firsthypothesisthatwe testconcernsthe role of thepresidentin influencingthe Court.
We argue that Republican presidentsprefermore conservative economic decisions than do
'3 We would like to thankan anonymous refereefor suggestingthat we emphasize this differencebetween our data set
and Spiller and Gely's.
14
Spiller and Gely (1992, p. 479) provide a clear discussion of this point.
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Table 1. Political Influenceover Supreme Court Economic Case Decisions, 1953-1993
Variable

Constant
Lower court,%
conservativedecisions
Supreme Court, %
Democratic appointments
Republican presidential
dummy
JudiciaryCommittee
chair ADA (Senate)
JudiciaryCommittee
chair ADA (house)
% Republican Senate

Eqn. I

Eqn. 2

Eqn. 3

Eqn. 4

0.67
(6.45)
-0.33
(1.84)
-0.003
(2.29)
0.14
(3.29)

0.91
(11.64)
-0.23
(1.70)
-0.004
(5.53)
0.16
(5.26)
-0.002
(5.79)
-0.003
(4.31)

1.38
(7.71)
-0.22
(1.62)
-0.005
(5.88)
0.13
(3.78)
-0.002
(6.85)
-0.003
(4.35)
-0.0003
(0.12)
-0.007
(1.88)

0.76
(6.72)
-0.13
(0.92)
-0.003
(4.50)
0.16
(5.41)
-0.001
(3.78)
-0.003
(4.76)

% Republican House
Lagged inflation
Lagged outputgrowth
R2

0.48

0.70

0.76

0.012
(2.59)
0.002
(0.67)
0.76

Absolute value of HAC t-statisticsare in parentheses.Dependent variable is the annual percentageof conservative
Supreme Court economic case decisions.

Democratic presidents.A direct way to capture the possible effectof these preferencesis to
incorporatea dummyvariable forpresidentialparty.An additionalsource of executiveinfluence
on the Court, pointed out by Dahl (1957), arises because presidentsselect justices subject to
Senate confirmation.'5
Since presidentialnominees to the Court are likely not to differsignificantlyin ideology fromtheirnominatingexecutive,we anticipatethatthe largerthe fractionof
the Court nominatedby Republicans (Democrats), the larger,on average, the fractionof conservative(liberal) decisions.16
Equation 1 of Table 1 confirmsthese hypotheses.Our Republican presidentialdummy
variable is positively and significantlycorrelatedwith the annual percentageof conservative
we findthaton average thereare 14% more
Supreme Court economic decisions. Quantitatively,
economic case decisions decided in a conservativedirectionunderRepublican administrations
than thereare under Democratic ones. We also finda significantinverse relationshipbetween
the fractionof justices appointed by Democratic presidentsand conservative decisions. The
standardizedcoefficienton this variable reveals thata one-standard-deviation
increase leads to
a .37-standard-deviation
decline in the fractionof conservativedecisions (roughly6% fewer).
This supportsan additionalpower of appointmentexecutive influence.'7
In Equation 2 (Table 1), we test for congressional influenceover the Court. Spiller and
between political agents and the Supreme Court.
15Recent work by Sutter(1997) stressesthe interrelationship

Chappell, Havrilesky,and McGregor (1993) show a significanteffectof this presidentialpower of appointmentin the
contextof monetarypolicy.
17 Each regressionin thispaper is estimatedusing Newey and West's covariance matrixestimator(HAC) thatis consistent
in the presence of both heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelationof an unknownform.
16
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Gely argue that this influencestems from the ability of Congress to overturndecisions via
legislation.Althoughsuch actions are rare,Weingastand Moran (1983) show thatovertaction
does not necessarily indicate the lack of effectivecongressional monitoring.In this case, the
threatof possible reversals via legislationwill limitthe Court's abilityto deviate too farfrom
congressional preferences."'We measure congressionalpreferenceby using the Americansfor
Democratic Action (ADA) scores of the chairs of the Senate and House JudiciaryCommittees.
The JudiciaryCommitteesare used since they are directlyresponsible for overseeing the Supreme Court.19ADA scores range between 100 (a perfectliberal votingrecord) and 0.
We expect a negative relationshipbetween the ADA scores and our dependentvariable.
The mean value of the ADA scores of the Senate JudiciaryCommitteechair is 25.83 (standard
deviation = 35). The average score forthe House chairis 79.31 (standarddeviation = 26). The
resultsin Equation 2 stronglysupportour hypothesisof an inverse relationshipbetween conservativeCourt decisions and our congressionalvariables. Both coefficientsforthe congressional variables are significantat betterthan the .01 level. Quantitatively,we findthata 35-point
increase in the ADA score of the Senate JudiciaryCommitteechair leads to an approximately
7% decline in the fractionof conservativeeconomic decisions. A similar-sizeresult is found
forour House chair variable-a one-standard-deviation
rise in the ADA score leads to about a
7% decline in the fractionof conservativeCourt decisions. In addition,our congressionalvariables do not weaken the influenceof our executive measures, which both remain strongly
significantwith similarmagnitudes.
In Equation 3 (Table 1), we take a closer look at the effectof Congress on the Court.
Although our committeeleadership variable works well, it could be picking up the effectof
Congress as a whole. We testforthis possibilityby includingthe annual percentageof Republicans in both the House and the Senate as regressors.The resultsshow thatour full congressional body measures are insignificantboth individuallyand as a group. However, both the
JudiciaryCommittee leadership ADA measures and the executive variables remain strongly
significant.This resultreinforcesour view thatcommitteeleadershipprovides the best measure
of congressionalinfluence.
Lastly, we test whethermacroeconomic conditions influenceSupreme Court rulings in
regard to economic cases. We include the lagged values of inflationand outputgrowthin our
empirical model. In looking for an output effecton the Court, we borrow from Peltzman's
(1976) theoryof regulation,which suggeststhatregulationshould be more pro-businessduring
economic downturnsand more pro-consumerduringexpansions. Shughartand Tollison (1985)
provide empirical supportfor this contention.In our setting,we expect thatthe conservative
fractionof the Court's economic decisions should be counter-cyclical.Using a similar line of
reasoning,we expect a positive relationshipbetween inflationand the fractionof conservative
economic decisions. Many of the liberalcategories(e.g., pro-liability,
and propro-environment,
in
case
would
tend
decisions
that
to
raise
We
would
then
involve,
regulation)
general,
prices.
expect,ceterisparibus, fewerof thosedecisions in timesof risingprices. The resultsin Equation
4 (Table 1) show that a highervalue of lagged inflationis associated with more conservative
Supreme Court economic decisions. Quantitatively,we find that a one-standard-deviation

18Toma (1991) suggests a more direct signaling game between the Court and Congress via budgetaryallocations.
19Here we are assuming disproportionatecommitteepower. Shepsle and Weingast (1987) provide a classic discussion.

We also assume thatcommitteechairs have more influencethan rank-and-filecommitteemembers.Grier(1991, 1996)

provides empirical supportforthis assumptionwith regardto monetarypolicy.
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Table 2. Political Model with AlternativeCongressionalPreferenceVariables, 1953-1993
Eqn. 1

Eqn. 2

Eqn. 3

Deflated average ADA scores (Senate)

0.94
(7.62)
-0.29
(1.86)
-0.005
(5.08)
0.15
(3.98)
-0.002
(4.87)
-0.003
(3.43)
-

0.71
(5.26)
-0.14
(0.83)
-0.004
(4.46)
0.15
(4.84)
-0.001
(3.60)
-0.002
(4.08)

Deflated average ADA scores (House)

-

0.47
(1.31)
-0.28
(1.88)
-0.003
(1.73)
0.19
(4.50)
-0.002
(5.31)
-0.003
(3.42)
0.009
(1.48)
0.001
(0.13)

Variable

Constant
Lower court,% conservativedecisions
Supreme Court, % Democratic appointments
Republican presidentialdummy
Deflated JudiciaryCommitteechair ADA (Senate)
Deflated JudiciaryCommitteechair ADA (House)

Lagged inflation
Lagged outputgrowth
0.67

R2

0.70

0.019
(3.03)
0.003
(1.00)
0.73

Absolute value of HAC t-statisticsare in parentheses.Dependent variable is the annual percentageof conservative
Supreme Court economic case decisions.

(3.02%) increase in lagged inflation,ceteris paribus, leads to a 3.5% increase in the fraction
of conservativeeconomic decisions. However, no significantrelationshipwas found between
the Court's economic decisions and economic growth.

5. AdditionalMeasures of CongressionalChange
In Table 2, we take anotherlook at the effectof congressionalchange on Supreme Court
economic case decisions. Althoughour preferredvariable uses the annual ADA score of the
House and Senate JudiciaryCommitteechair to measure congressionalpreferences,such measures do have certainproblems.Groseclose, Levitt,and Snyder (1999) argue thatADA scores
sets of votes each year to
are difficultto compare over time since interestgroups use different
calculate scores. A similar problem arises when comparing members across chambers since
differentsets of votes are used forthe House and Senate. Fortunately,Groseclose, Levitt,and
Snyderhave managed to constructan index thatallows researchersto convert"nominal" ADA
scores into "real" scores, which can be used to make intertemporal
and interchamber
comparisons.20
Equation 1 in Table 2 replaces the nominalADA score of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committeechair with deflatedmeasures based on the GLS index. The average of our adjusted
ADA measure is 20.22 for the Senate (standard deviation = 32) and 74.36 for the House
20

ADA scores matterby showing thatthe
Groseclose, Levitt,and Snyder(1999) demonstratethattheirinflation-adjusted
conclusions of a previous studyby Levitt (1996) dramaticallychange once the adjusted scores are used.
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(standarddeviation = 26). We findthatthe deflatedmeasures of congressionalpreferenceare
both negative and significantat the .01 level. The standardizedcoefficientsreveal that a oneincrease in the Senate (House) score leads to a 6.5% (7.7%) decrease in the
standard-deviation
fractionof conservativeeconomic decisions. The inclusion of these alternativemeasures does
not substantivelyaffectthe statisticalor quantitativesignificanceof our two presidentialvariables. Thus, the resultspresentedin Table 1 are robustto these index numberchanges.
Groseclose, Levitt,and Snyder (1999) also allow us to compute the annual deflatedADA
scores of the full Senate and House. These measures are added in Equation 2 (Table 2) to once
again check whetherthe committeeleadershipvariable is really picking up changes in the full
congressional body. Althoughour previous congressional and executive variables remain significant,an F-test failed to reject the null hypothesisthat the full chamber deflatedaverage
scores were jointly insignificant.We argue that this provides the strongestevidence to date
regardingthe relativeimportanceof committeechairs in exertingcongressionalinfluence.
Lastly, Equation 3 (Table 2) adds our macroeconomic variables to the political model.
while lagged outputgrowth
Once again, we findthatlagged inflationis positive and significant,
is insignificant.Overall, the results in Table 2 show the robustnessof our specificationsand
major results.

6. ConcludingComment
Althoughmost legal scholars view the Supreme Court as a completelyinsulated,independent, and apolitical institution,social scientistshave recentlystartedto subject it to the same
scrutinythey have applied in other settings.Analyzing Supreme Court voting on economic
cases for the period 1953-1993, we uncover strong evidence of executive, legislative, and
macroeconomic influenceon Court behavior.These results are robustto various specification
changes in our models and measurementchanges in our variables. They supportthe small (but
growing)view thatthe SupremeCourtis influencedby politicalforcesand should notbe viewed
as an autonomous decision-makingunit.
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